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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- No. 15551 
FREDRICK WILLIAM ALBERT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty after 
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft, a Class A 
misdemeanor in the Fourth Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah in and for Duchesne County, the Honorable Allen 
B. Sorensen, Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have this case dismissed or, 
in the alternative, to order the district court to allow de-
fendant to withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Fredrick William Albert, was charged 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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with the crime of theft, a Class A misdemeanor, as defined in 
Section 76-6-412(l)(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953). The in-
formation alleges that on or about the 5th day of August, 1977, 
the defendant did commit the crime of theft as defined in Sec-
tion 76-6-604, Utah Code Annotated (1953) in Roosevelt, 
Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
On the 26th day of October, 1977, the defendant came 
before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, for the purposes 
of arraignment. At the time of the arraignment the defendant 
was without representation of counsel. Apparently the defen-
dant could not meet his selected counsel's retainer fee, so 
selected counsel refused to accompany the defendant to the 
arraignment. (Transcript of proceedings hereinafter referred 
to as Tr.) (Tr. 1, 2.) 
The defendant attempted to enter a guilty plea with-
out representation of counsel, but the Court refused to enter-
tain the plea without defendant being represented by counsel. 
The prosecuting attorney then asked the Court, "If 
they confer with counsel today, may this come back on at the 
end of the calendar?" (Tr. 2.) 
At that time an attorney who happened to be in the 
courtroom came forward and agreed to represent the defendant. 
After a short conference, the matter came before the Court 
again. Whereupon the Court accepted the defendant's guilty 
plea. The guilty plea was accepted without personally 
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addressing the defendant to determine if the plea was volun-
tary or if the defendant understood the consequences of his 
guilty plea. The relevant portions of the transcript read 
as follows: 
THE COURT: Let the record show. 
Mr. Albert you may enter a plea 
to this charge now or you have a 
right to additional time to think 
it over. What is your request as 
to the entry of plea? 
MR. ALBERT: I will make my plea 
today, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: To the charge con-
tained in the information what is 
your plea? 
MR. ALBERT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Were these the same 
transactions? 
MR. DRANEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. MANGAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: You were with Mr. Mach 
I take it? 
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you hear the 
questions I asked him about his 
wishes to enter a plea of guilty? 
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir, I did. 
THE COURT: Would any of your 
answers to those questions be any 
different? 
MR. ALBERT: No, sir. 
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THE COURT: The court finds the 
defendant is voluntarily offer-
ing to enter a plea of guilty 
and directs the clerk to enter 
that plea. 
The defendant came before the Court on the 22nd day 
of November, 1977, for the pronouncement of judgment and 
sentence. The Court announced that the judgment would be a 
six-month confinement in the Duchesne County Jail. 
The defendant filed his notice of appeal on the 23rd 
day of November, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
AN INQUIRY TO THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY 
AS TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS GUILTY 
PLEA AND TO DETERHINE THAT THE DEFENDA~TT 
UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA. 
The defendant came before the trial court for the 
purpose of entering a guilty plea. The trial judge did not 
personally inquire of the defendant if he understood the con-
sequences of his plea or if the plea was voluntary. He merely 
asked if the defendant heard the questions he had asked to a 
Mr. Mach who had been arraigned just prior to the defendant 
on the same charge who had also pleaded guilty, and if the 
defendant would change any of his answers. 
This does not conform with the requirements for the 
determination of the voluntariness or the requirement to 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inquire as to the defendant's understanding of the conse-
quences of his guilty plea, as required by the United States 
Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. In that 
case the Supreme Court held that as constitutional require-
ment, the court must inquire into the constitutional rights 
involved. The Court stated: 
Several federal constitutional 
rights are involved in a waiver 
that takes place when a plea of 
guilty is entered in a state 
criminal trial. First, is the 
privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment and 
applicable to the States by 
reason of the Fourteenth. 
Malloa v. Hogan, 378 u.s. 1. 
Secon , is the the right to trial 
by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145. Third, is the 
right to confront one's accusers. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400. 
We cannot presume a waiver of 
these three important federal 
rights from a silent record. 
What is at stake for an accused 
facing death or imprisonment de-
mands the utmost solicitude of 
which courts are capable in can-
vassing the matter with the 
accused to make sure he has a 
full understanding of what the 
plea connotes and of its conse-
quence. When the judge dis-
charges that function, he leaves 
a record adequate for any review 
that may be later sought . . 
In the present case the transcript and record of the 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
above defendant's proceeding is silent as to any inquiry by 
the trial court to the defendant as to the defendant's under-
standing of the consequences of his guilty plea or as to its 
voluntariness. 
The purpose of the Boykin requirement that the trial 
judge personally address the defendant concerning his waiver 
of his constitutional rights is to insure that the defendant 
understands the consequences of his plea and to guarantee that 
it is voluntary. 
The constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea 
are far too important to allow a trial judge to expect a de-
fendant to listen to the interrogation of a different defen-
dant in a different action whose outcome does not affect the 
outcome of his own case. The record of the defendant's own 
proceeding must reflect that the defendant voluntarily and 
understandingly waived his constitutional rights. 
The above-entitled court should not be forced to 
look into the transcript of an entirely separate proceeding 
whose transcript was not ordered by either party to the action 
and only available through the action of the trial judge and 
should not be included as part of the record on appeal. 
The record of the above defendant's proceeding is 
silent as to the defendant's understanding of the effects of 
his guilty plea or as to its voluntariness. As the Court said 
in Boykin, "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important 
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federal rights from a silent record." (Id. at 243.) 
Therefore the defendant prays that his judgment as 
in Boykin be reversed or, in the alternative, to order the 
district court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 
and set the matter for trial. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AS A !-'1.ATTER OF 
LAW SHOULD ADOPT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY PLEAS AS SET 
OUT IN FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE RULE 11 . 
The United States Supreme Court in Boykin, supra, 
held that when a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge 
he waives several federal constitutional rights and that 
therefore "The question of an effective waiver of a federal 
constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by 
federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422." 
(Id. at 243.) 
The appropriate federal standards for the accept-
ance of guilty pleas and the procedures to safeguard defen-
dant's constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are set 
out in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11. 
In interpreting the effect of the majority opinion 
in Boykin, a dissent written by Mr. Justice Harlan points 
out: 
The court thus in effect fastens 
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upon the States, as a matter of 
federal constitutional law, the 
rigid prophylactic requirements 
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. (Id. at 
245.) -
Therefore, in order to adequately protect the defen-
dant's federal constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea, 
the above-entitled court should adopt as a matter of law the 
standards for determining voluntariness of a guilty plea and 
that defendant understands the consequence of his guilty plea 
as set out in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
BE REPRESENTED BY ADEQUATE COUNSEL. 
The defendant appeared before the Honorable Allen 
B. Sorensen, Judge, for arraignment without counsel. The 
counsel defendant had selected to represent him refused to 
attend the arraignment because the defendant could not pay his 
retainer fee. The trial judge announced he would not accept 
the defendant's plea if he was not ~epresented by counsel and 
announced he would continue the matter. The prosecuting attor-
neyney thereupon asked the Court, "If they confer with counsel 
today, may this come back on at the end of the calendar?" (Tr. 2 ·) 
It was then arranged that an attorney who happened to be in the 
courtroom would represent the defendant. (Tr. 3.) After a brief 
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conference, the defendant came back before the Court and a 
plea of guilty was entered and accepted as more fully dis-
cussed in Point I. 
The case of Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241, 22 Utah 
2d 118 (1969) facts are remarkably similar to the present 
case. In that case when the defendants came before the 
district court for the purposes of arraignment. The judge 
appointed an attorney who happened to be in the courtroom at 
the time to represent the defendants. After a brief confer-
ence with the attorney in the judge's chambers, the defendants 
entered pleas of guilty. (See p. 242.) 
The Utah Supreme Court held that this was inadequate 
counsel and remanded the case for new trial. In announcing 
its position, the Court stated: 
The right of an accused to have 
counsel as assured by Sec. 12, 
Art. I, Utah Constitution, and 
by the VI and XIV Amendments to 
the U. S. Constitution is one of 
those rights "rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our 
people" as essential to the pro-
tection of individual liberties 
and therefore included in our 
concept of due process of law. 
The requirement is not satisfied 
by a sham or pretense of an 
appearance in the record by an 
attorney who manifests no real 
concern about the interests of 
the accused. 
The Court then held: 
-9-
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The failure of such representa-
tion for the petitioner herein 
is a departure from due process 
of law. (Id. at 243.) 
The Fifth Circuit in Windom v. Cook, 423 F.2d 721 
(1970) held that where a court-appointed counsel's only con-
ference with defendant came just prior to the arraignment 
proceeding at which the guilty plea was entered, lasted for a 
period of between fifteen and thirty minutes and did not dis-
cuss the elements of the crimes charged (id., at 721) with 
the defendants, that such representation constituted inade-
quate counsel. 
Therefore in the present case where defendant's 
counsel was unaware of the facts of the case or any defenses 
available to the defendant, who had no real concern about the 
interests of the defendant and only conferred with the defen-
dant for a few short moments before representing the defendant 
and aiding him in his plea of guilty, does not satisfy the 
requirements that defendant be assured counsel as guaranteed 
by Section 12, Article I of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. The representation of the defendant in this case con-
stituted a sham or at best a pretense of an appearance of 
representation of counsel in the record and therefore violates 
the defendant's right to due process of law and right to 
counsel, necessitating that the above court dismiss the 
-10-
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action against the defendant or, in the alternative, to order 
the district court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea and to set the matter for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly accepted defendant's 
plea of guilty by failing to inquire of the defendant person-
ally whether or not he understood the consequences of his 
guilty plea or if his plea was voluntary. The record of this 
defendant's proceeding is silent as to any inquiry made by 
the trial judge to this defendant and is therefore error, for 
the Court cannot assume voluntary waiver of the constitutional 
rights involved by a guilty plea from a silent record. 
(Boykin.) 
In order to adequately protect that the constitu-
tional rights waived in a plea of guilty are knowing and vol-
untary, the above court should adopt the requirements of 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 as a matter of 
law, as required by Boykin. 
Further, the defendant was denied constitutional 
right to counsel by the trial court allowing an attorney who 
happened to be in the courtroom, who had no knowledge or 
interest in defendant's case, and who only met with the de-
fendant for a few moments before the defendant entered his 
guilty plea to advise and represent the defendant in entering 
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his guilty plea. 
As a result of the above infringements of the defen-
dant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Utah Consti-
tution and the United States Constitution, the above court 
should dismiss the case against the defendant or, in the alter-
native, to order the district court to allow the defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
\ 
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